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There is a considerable debate in the legal literature about the purpose of antitrust institutions. 
Some argue that antitrust law merely serves the purpose of economic growth, while others have a 
broader perspective on the function of antitrust, maintaining that the prevention of economic 
concentration is an important means to promote democratization and democratic stability. This 
contribution seeks to test the empirical assumptions of this normative debate. Using panel data of 
154 states from 1960 to 2007, it analyzes whether antitrust law actually has a positive effect on 
democracy and economic growth. The paper finds that antitrust law has a strongly positive effect 
on the level of GDP per capita and economic growth. However, there is no significant positive 
effect on the level of democracy. It is suggested that these results might be due to the current 
structure of existing antitrust laws, which are designed to promote economic efficiency rather 
than to prevent economic concentration.  2
I.   Introduction 
According to standard economic theory, competition is a crucial element for the functioning of 
markets. If there is no sufficient competition either on the demand or on the supply side, some 
market participants may obtain dominant market positions that allow them to set prices in their 
favor, impeding an efficient allocation of goods. Therefore, many national economies establish 
special antitrust institutions seeking to prevent the emergence of monopolies or cartels and thus 
guaranteeing sufficient market competition. Despite this fundamentally economic rationale, there 
is a fierce debate in legal scholarship about the normative foundations and goals of antitrust law. 
Orthodox theory claims that the promotion of economic efficiency was the exclusive aim of anti-
trust regimes (Bork 1993). Other scholars agree on the economic aim of antitrust law, but have a 
more distributive understanding of its functions (Akman 2009). 
However, not everyone believes that antitrust law has an exclusively economic function. Some 
prominent scholars try to establish a link between antitrust law and the promotion of democracy. 
This strand of thought developed because of the conviction that business cartels played a crucial 
role in the rise to power of the Nazi regime in Germany (Gerber 1994: 28-29). For this reason, 
the effect of cartelization on the political landscape in Weimar Germany prompted the Ameri-
cans to force Germany to adopt an effective antitrust regime after the end of the Second World 
War (Quack and Djelic 2005: 258-59) and gave rise to the influential Freiburg School that 
shaped economic and political thinking in post-war Germany. 
However, the idea that antitrust law may have a positive effect on the stability of democracy is 
not limited to Germany. Many North American scholars also highlight the connection between 
the two fields. Most prominently, Milton Friedman (1962: 16) argues that the dispersion of eco-
nomic power is a necessary counterbalance to the centralization of political power in the gov-
ernment. Some legal scholars also point out the positive effect of antitrust law for democracy and 
advocate a stronger democratic interpretation of antitrust practices (Adams 1979; Green 1987; 
Barnes 1989: 809-28). 
The debate on the foundations of antitrust law has, so far, been almost exclusively normative. 
There have been few empirical analyses on whether antitrust law actually promotes economic 
development or democracy. This study aims at filling this void. After a short review of the em-
pirical literature on this issue, the paper will first deal with the relationship between antitrust law 
and economic growth and democracy on a theoretical level. The relationship between antitrust 
law and economic growth seems to be straightforward, as the better functioning of economic 
markets should also enhance general welfare. 
In contrast, a potential positive effect of the existence of an antitrust institution on democracy 
seems to be more counterintuitive. The argument consists of two steps. First, it is argued that 
antitrust law contributes to preventing an overly strong concentration of economic resources 
within a society. Second, a deconcentration of economic resources makes it more likely that a 
society will make the transition to a democracy and it stabilizes a democracy once it is estab-  3
lished. This is due to two reasons: on the one hand, the dispersion of resources leads to a societal 
balance of power. On the other hand, the incentives of economic elites to oppose democracy are 
the stronger the greater the cleavage of wealth is in a society. 
The quantitative analysis is based on panel data of 154 states from 1960 to 2007. It finds that the 
introduction of an antitrust regime has a strongly significant positive effect on economic devel-
opment and growth. However, it does not find a significant positive effect of antitrust law on the 
level of democracy. The concluding part of the paper, finally, deals with several explanations for 
why there is no positive finding on the relationship between antitrust law and democracy. It sug-
gests that this might be due to the currently prevalent structure of antitrust law, which focuses 
not on economic concentration as such, but rather on concentration in particular markets. 
II.   The Empirical Literature 
The empirical evidence on the effects of antitrust law is scarce. There is some empirical evidence 
on the effects of antitrust regimes (1.). However, there are no studies on the relationship of com-
petition and democracy. But there are several studies analyzing different factors that are sup-
posed to enhance the quality of democracy (2.) 
1.   The Effects of Antitrust Regimes 
Although, there have not been any attempts so far to analyze the relationship between antitrust 
regimes and democracy empirically, there are several empirical studies on measuring the effec-
tiveness of antitrust regimes. The main focus of these studies is the effect of antitrust laws on 
economic indicators, such as economic growth, productivity or the level of competition. There 
are several empirical studies that try to establish that competition has a positive effect on eco-
nomic growth (Dutz and Hayri 2000) and welfare (Baker 2003). While Baker’s conclusions are 
based on historical case studies, Dutz and Hayri make a cross-sectional analysis of different 
countries using various indicators for the intensity of the competition. They do, however, not 
address whether the analyzed countries actually have an antitrust institution. Some studies also 
show opposing trends. With several case studies Robert Crandall and Clifford Winston (2003) 
try to show that antitrust regulation does not influence the development of market prices and 
does not, thus, enhance consumer welfare.
1 Furthermore, Hiau Looi Kee and Bernard Hoekman 
(2007) found in an econometric analysis that there is no significant effect of the presence of an 
antitrust law on the actual level of competition. 
While the aforementioned studies either focus on the actual level of competition or the mere 
presence of competition law, there are also analyses that try to qualify the institutional quality of 
                                        
1   See also the historical analysis of Carsten Burhop and Thorsten Lübbers, who show that the cartelization of 
the German coal industry before the First World War did not have a significant effect on the productive effi-
ciency of the industry (Burhop and Lübbers 2009).  4
antitrust regimes and to measure whether the institutional quality has an effect on the actual level 
of competition or economic growth. Michael Krakowski (2002) analyzed the effect of the expe-
rience of a competition agency and found that the level of competition increases the longer a 
competition agency has been in place. 
Some studies try to evaluate the scope of the antitrust regime and to see whether the scope has an 
effect on the level of competition. Michael Nicholson (2008) develops an Antitrust Law Index 
(ALI) that measures the scope of different competition law regimes. He focuses on the ‘law in 
the books’ and analyzes three dimensions of antitrust law: regime structure, merger policy and 
anticompetitive practices (Nicholson 2008: 1019). He analyzes whether a competition regime 
possesses certain formal characteristics and awards one or two points if these characteristics ex-
ist. He finds, however, that nominally strong antitrust regimes do not necessarily lead to a high 
level of competition. This result is confirmed by Keith Hylton and Fei Deng (2007), who basical-
ly use the same index and find that there is no statistically significant positive relationship be-
tween the nominal scope of the competition regime and the actual level of competition. 
The previous two studies tried to evaluate the antitrust law ‘in the books’, i.e., the strength of the 
regime, as it presents itself from the legal texts. However, there is always a significant gap be-
tween the nominal provisions and the actual implementation of the provisions in practice. Two 
further studies try to take this difference into account by looking at the actual practice of differ-
ent antitrust regimes. Mark Dutz and Maria Vagliasindi (2000) evaluate the effectiveness of anti-
trust regimes in transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union based on an 
analysis of their practice. They code the different regimes based on the level of law enforcement, 
competition advocacy and institutional-related activities (Dutz and Vagliasindi 2000: 765). Us-
ing a cross-sectional data set, they find that the quality of the antitrust regime has a positive ef-
fect on the level of competition in the observed countries. 
Stefan Voigt (2009) equally proposes an indicator for the effectiveness of antitrust regimes that 
is not merely based on the ‘law in the books’, but also takes the actual institutional practice into 
account. Based on a survey of the practice of various antitrust agencies, he comes up with indica-
tors for the formal basis of the regime, the use of economic methods, the de jure and the de facto 
independence. He finds that both, the de jure and the de facto independence of the antitrust 
agency have a positive effect on the total factor productivity of a country. 
2.   The Conditions Enhancing the Quality of Democracy 
There is an intense discussion in comparative politics and economics on which factors facilitate 
the transition to democracy or strengthen a democracy once it has been established. There are 
two strands of this discussion. Some scholars rather focus on the socio-economic environment 
that enhances the quality of democracy, while others analyze the behavior and the incentives of 
political elites and times of regime transition. The first and most prominent approach from the 
socio-economic perspective was modernization theory, according to which the level of economic   5
development has a positive effect on the quality of democracy in a country (Lipset 1959). This 
positive relationship between economic development and democratization has been confirmed in 
several empirical studies (Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Diamond 1992; Londregan 
and Poole 1996; Barro 1996, 1999; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006). It is supposed to 
be observed because a higher level of economic development leads to a higher level of education 
and a more diversified society. The diversification leads to a greater demand for institutions that 
tolerate pluralism, and education teaches tolerance for pluralistic values. Both factors should en-
hance the demand for democratic governance (Lipset 1959: 78-85). 
However, some authors have raised doubts about the empirical relationship between economic 
development and democracy. The mere existence of a correlation between the two factors does 
not mean that economic development causes transition to democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 
1997). Causation may also run into the other direction, or both factors may be caused at the same 
time by certain historical determinants (Acemoglu et al. 2008). Therefore, Adam Przeworski and 
colleagues have proposed a reduced version of the relationship between economic development 
and democracy: while economic development does not increase the likelihood of a transition to 
democracy, it stabilizes democracy once it has been established (Przeworski et al. 2000: 92-
106).
2 
But there are also alternative explanations of why democracies emerge and persist. Tatu 
Vanhanen (1990) argues that democratization depends on the distribution of power-resources. 
The more centralized power-resources are, the easier it is to suppress the majority population and 
thus to prevent a transition to democracy. Other authors also focus on distributive issues, but ra-
ther concentrate on the distribution of material wealth. According to Carles Boix (2003), transi-
tion to democracy depends on the distribution of wealth and capital mobility. The more distribut-
ed wealth is, the less the wealthy elites of a country have to fear the redistributive effect of de-
mocracy. Even if there is a high concentration of wealth, democracy may nevertheless be 
implemented if capital is mobile, so that the elites have the opportunity to evade taxes by bring-
ing their fortunes abroad. 
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006) also refer to wealth distribution as a key factor for 
the quality of democracy. They argue that we observe greater interdependencies in industrialized 
societies with greater material equality. In such societies, physical repression is much more cost-
ly for the wealthy elites, which increases the likelihood of democracy. Finally, there are some 
cultural explanations, which argue that the stability of democracy is dependent on the internali-
zation of democratic values by the population and the political elites (Almond and Verba 1963; 
Diamond and Linz 1989). This internalization of democratic values is enhanced by experience 
with democracy. The more experience a country has with democratic governance, the more like-
ly it is that it will sustain democracy (Persson and Tabellini 2009). 
                                        
2   But see the critique of Przeworski et al. (2000) that is voiced by Boix and Stokes (2003) and Epstein et al. 
(2006).  6
The actor-centric approaches analyze the incentives of the economic, political and societal elites 
who can influence the political fate of a country in times of transition. According to this perspec-
tive, democracy will usually be established if none of several competing groups of the elite has a 
clear advantage so that the procedural insecurity introduced by democracy seems to be the best 
option (Przeworski 1986; Sørensen 1998). Furthermore, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and col-
leagues (2002) argue that the size of the electorate, i.e., the members of the elite with potential 
political influence, is decisive for the stability of an autocracy. The bigger the electorate, the 
more instable is an autocracy, and the more likely is a transition to democracy. 
III.   Antitrust and the Promotion of Economic Development  
and Democracy 
This section will take a closer look at the causal mechanism of why antitrust law is supposed to 
promote democracy and economic development. It will first give a short account on the emer-
gence of antitrust regimes (1.) before analyzing the relationship of antitrust law and democracy 
(2.) and economic growth (3.) in more detail. 
1.   The Emergence of Antitrust Institutions 
For more than a half century, antitrust law was an exclusively North American affair. Canada 
and the United States introduced their antitrust legislation at the end of the 19
th century and were 
for long the only states on this path. After World War II, Japan and some European countries 
followed. However, it was not before the 1990s that antitrust laws became a common phenome-
non that can be found in all regions of the world (see figure 1). Today, more than half of the 
member states of the United Nations have an antitrust institution. The reasons for countries to 
introduce an antitrust law differ. Some countries had internal reasons, introducing antitrust legis-
lation as part of an economic reform. Others reacted to external pressure by international institu-
tions, such as the European Union or the World Bank. I will highlight two examples in order to 
show the different paths that countries have taken to establish competition institutions – South 
Korea and Senegal. 
South Korea introduced antitrust legislation in 1980 by adopting the Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act.
3 The Korean economy had experienced substantial growth in the 1960s and 
1970s (see figure 2), during which it developed from an agricultural to an industrial and com-
mercial economy. This economic transformation led to a considerable concentration of economic 
power in the hands of a few business conglomerations, known as ‘chaebol’. The emergence of 
these chaebol was aided by the Korean government because it was thought that taking advantage 
of economies of scale would promote economic development. In the 1970s, however, many ob-
servers came to the conclusion that this concentration of economic power harmed the competi-
                                        
3   For a detailed account of the history of the legislation of Korean antitrust law, see Wagner 1987: 471-76.   7
tiveness of the Korean economy. When the country experienced an economic slowdown in the 
late 1970s, the government changed its attitude towards the chaebol and tried to limit their eco-
nomic power. The introduction of the 1980 antitrust law was thus one piece of the strategy of 
disempowering the Korean business conglomerates. 
Senegal suffered a phase of significant economic contraction in the early 1990s (see figure 3). As 
a reaction to this economic downturn, the country implemented an economic reform program in 
1994 under a World Bank initiative in order to liberalize its economy. The introduction of a 
modern competition and antitrust law was one part of the reform program, whose cornerstone 
was the devaluation of the currency (Clement et al. 2001: 19). The law was not implemented 
before the summer of 1996, when the Competition Commission was created and the Commis-
sioners were officially appointed. But even thereafter, the Commission was underfunded and the 
regime basically ineffective. However, at the end of the 1990s, the Senegalese government real-
ized that some economic sectors were working in a dysfunctional manner because of competition 
issues, so that they made serious efforts to make the antitrust system more effective (Clement et 
al. 2001: 20-22). 
2.   The Causal Mechanism: Antitrust Law and Democracy 
The theoretical argument on why the establishment of an antitrust regime should have a positive 
effect on the quality of democracy has two steps. First, antitrust regimes are supposed to prevent 
the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few. In a competitive market, a product 
will be offered at a price based on the competition between different suppliers. In a monopolized 
or cartelized economy, the producer of a good or the provider of a service has the ability to de-
termine the price independently. There are no competitors who will undercut the price if it is too 
high. Therefore, a monopolist or a cartel will reap a greater benefit from offering her product at a 
higher price than she would in a competitive market. Consequently, the supplier side keeps a 
bigger share of the transactions than it would in a competitive market. In contrast to cartels, mo-
nopolies have a second way to enhance economic concentration. They are simply the only play-
ers in the specific market sector. If there were more than one player, the economic benefits of 
supplying the market would not be concentrated in one hand. 
Second, economic deconcentration increases the likelihood that a country will either transition to 
democracy, or it strengthens the stability of an already established democracy. This argument has 
two dimensions: on the one hand, economic elites have to have the power to influence politics, 
and this influence is the greater the higher the concentration of economic wealth is. On the other 
hand, economic and political elites must have incentives to allow a transition to democracy or 
not to oppose an already existing democracy if there is a higher level of material equality. 
Political authority does not exist in a vacuum. It rests on power, and this power is dependent on 
resources. Autocratic regimes can thus not sustain themselves. Instead, they need military and 
police forces, money to pay these forces, information, media, machines and scientific-technical  8
knowledge (Tilly 2007: 116) in order to be able to rule the country. Therefore, they need the 
support of the economic elites, who supply them with all these means. The greater the size of the 
group of supporters is, the more instable this group will be. The more concentrated the necessary 
resources are in the hands of a few, the more stable is the autocratic regime (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 2002). 
Democracy is generally understood as a political system that broadens the selectorate, i.e., the 
group of people who can exert political power. If economic wealth is concentrated in the hands 
of a few and if the non-wealthy possess the majority of votes in the democratic decision-making 
process, then democracy often has a redistributive effect. The poor majority will use their votes 
to establish redistributive institutions.
4 Therefore, the wealthy elites will oppose democracy as 
long as the costs of suppressing the population are below the costs of redistributive politics. Con-
sequently, increasing material equality leads to less redistributive pressure and thus decreases the 
costs of democracy for wealthy elites (Boix 2003). At the same time, it increases the costs of 
oppression as a more differentiated economy leads to more interdependence between the differ-
ent societal groups (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
3.   The Effect of Antitrust Law on Economic Development 
Standard economic theory argues that antitrust law promotes economic welfare because it guar-
antees a certain level of competition und thus enhances the functioning of market mechanisms. 
Markets work better if there is a considerable number of suppliers and consumers, which gives 
market participants a certain choice. If the number of market actors is too small, the functioning 
of the market is restrained, which leads to a loss in economic efficiency. Prices are usually high-
er in markets with restrained competition than they would be in situations of full competition. 
This leads to a so-called deadweight loss in markets in which demand increases with decreasing 
prices because more consumers would buy the product if the price were lower (Harberger 1964). 
However, the deadweight loss is not the only reason why economic concentration in markets 
leads to a decrease of economic welfare. As companies can extract high rents out of monopolies, 
they have strong incentives to invest in the fight for a monopoly and the defense of such a mo-
nopoly once they have established it (Tullock 1967). The means that are invested into this fight 
against competitors do not have any economic benefit and thus impede economic efficiency 
(Tullock 1967: 228).  
 
                                        
4   However, redistribution is not a necessary consequence of democracy. Ian Shapiro points out that wealthy 
elites have more means to organize themselves, to make their interests heard in the political process and even 
to frame certain matters in such a way that their interests are seemingly aligned with the interests of the poor 
and the middle class (Shapiro 2006: 104-45). However, the experience of the European welfare state shows 
that democracy may very well have redistributive effects.   9
IV.   The Research Design 
The question of the effect of antitrust law on democracy and economic development will be stud-
ied using panel data of 154 countries from 1960 to 2007.
5 In this section, I will explain the re-
search design of the study. One of the dependent variables, democracy, and our main explanatory 
variable, the existence of an antitrust regime, are, to a certain extent, qualitative concepts. We 
thus have to find a way to transform qualitative observations into quantitative data. I will address 
this challenge both for democracy (1.) and for the existence of an antitrust regime (2.). Further-
more, it is the aim of the study to test a causal claim – does the existence of an antitrust regime 
make a difference for economic development and democracy? There are two challenges that 
have to be addressed in this respect. First, we have to control for the causal direction of the ef-
fect. It is plausible that democracy and economic development are not only enhanced by antitrust 
law, but that economically developed and democratic countries are also more likely to introduce 
antitrust institutions. If we find a correlation between both factors, we do not know the direction 
of the causal effect so that we also have to control for the endogeneity of the explanatory varia-
ble (3.). Second, we have to make sure that the effects that we observe are not spurious, i.e., that 
the effect of antitrust on economic development and democracy is not due to a third, unobserved 
factor. Therefore, we have to include appropriate control variables into our model (4.). 
1.   The Quality of Democracy 
The definition of the concept of democracy is highly debated. One of the disagreements is 
whether democracy is a binary or a gradual concept. According to a binary understanding of de-
mocracy, a political system is either democratic, or it is not – there is neither a space in between 
these two situations, nor can democracy have different qualities. Such a binary understanding is 
used in many empirical studies of democracy. Following Adam Przeworski and colleagues 
(2000), there are several contributions that use a binary definition of democracy (Boix 2003; 
Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006). According to Przeworski and colleagues (2000: 15), 
a country is democratic if the chief executive body and the seats in the effective legislative body 
were either directly or indirectly filled by contested elections. Elections are considered to be con-
tested if their outcome is uncertain ex-ante, irreversible ex-post, and if they are held repeatedly 
(Przeworski et al. 2000: 16). 
The alternative is to define democracy gradually. According to the gradual definition, democracy 
is not just an either-/or-concept, but there can also be democracies of different quality. While 
democracy certainly has a binary component, as we still need to distinguish democracies from 
non-democracies, it is useful for the purpose of our analysis to add a gradual dimension to the 
definition of democracy.
6 If we look at the negative influences that the concentration of econom-
ic power can have on democratic politics, not all of them have to lead to a total breakdown of 
                                        
5   For a list of the included countries, see Appendix B. 
6   On the dual nature of democracy as binary and gradual concept, see Sartori 1987; Bogdandy 2001.  10
democracy. Instead, the decrease of the quality of democracy might be expressed by a strength-
ening of executive powers at the expense of the legislature, an erosion of the rule of law or the 
limitation of civil liberties. Such changes cannot be grasped by a binary measure of democracy. 
Therefore, this study adopts a gradual conception. Increases in quality are not only transitions to 
democracy, but also an increase of the institutional quality of an already existing democracy. In 
order to measure the quality of democracy, I will use the Polity IV-score, which codes political 
systems based on three different characteristics – executive recruitment, the constraints on the 
execution of executive power and the amount of political competition (Marshall and Jaggers 
2009). 
2.   The Measurement of Antitrust Law 
Measuring the existence of an antitrust regime seems, at first glance, to be a rather simple exer-
cise. We can observe whether and when an antitrust law was introduced in the countries of our 
data set and use a binary code to distinguish between the two states of the world – a one for the 
existence of an antitrust regime and a zero otherwise. However, such a binary coding only tells 
us whether such antitrust institutions exist in the books. It does not tell us anything about the ef-
fectiveness of the regime. Even though certain countries may have established antitrust institu-
tions, these institutions might be ineffective because they lack sufficient funds to carry out their 
work or because their operation is impeded by political actors following different interests. 
We could try to solve this problem by finding a measure for the effectiveness of antitrust re-
gimes. There have been some proposals in the legal and economic literature to quantify the ef-
fectiveness of antitrust laws. Michael Nicholson (2008) develops an Antitrust Law Index (ALI) 
that measures the scope of different competition law regimes. He focuses on the ‘law in the 
books’ and analyzes three dimensions of antitrust law: regime structure, merger policy and anti-
competitive practices (Nicholson 2008: 1019). He analyzes whether a competition regime pos-
sesses certain formal characteristics and awards one or two points if these characteristics exist. If 
there are, e.g., prison sentences as possible sanctions or if there is the possibility of private en-
forcement of competition provisions, then a certain competition regime will be awarded one 
point. In the end, Nicholson can classify every competition regime on a scale from zero to 29 
with zero being the least and 29 the most effective. 
However, Nicholson only deals with the ‘law in the books’ and is not concerned with its imple-
mentation. There are often decisive differences between the ‘law in the books’ and the law in 
action, though. In some cases, legal provisions are not implemented at all or very sparely. In oth-
er cases, the legal practice looks different than one would assume from just reading the legal 
texts. It can therefore be argued that public policy and the general socio-economic approach are 
more decisive factors for the effectiveness of antitrust law than its actual formal scope (Gal 
2004: 26).   11
Stefan Voigt (2009) tries do deal with this problem by setting up an index that measures the ef-
fectiveness of an antitrust regime in practice. Based on questionnaires that he sent to antitrust 
authorities, he comes up with scores for the de jure and the de facto independence of these anti-
trust authorities. While these scores are probably better proxies for the effectiveness of an anti-
trust regime than the mere formal evaluation of the ‘law in the books’, the index has some prac-
tical disadvantages. It does not consist of time-series data, so that it allows only cross-sectional 
analyses. However, we need time-series data in order to cope with the endogeneity problem and 
to track long-term effects of antitrust law. 
Instead of trying to evaluate the quality of antitrust regimes, we can also look at their effects in 
order to find proxies for their effectiveness. One common way to measure the effectiveness of 
antitrust institutions is to take survey data from the World Economic Forum on the perceived 
effectiveness of the antimonopoly policy. In the survey, several executives are asked about what 
they think about how effective the antimonopoly policy in their country is. This survey has two 
disadvantages. First, there is probably considerable measurement error, so that it is only a vague 
proxy for the effectiveness of an antitrust regime. The data shows a high volatility of the score 
for the same country between different years, which suggests that it is probably not a reliable 
measure. Second, although there is data available over time, the time span is very short. The 
maximum is ten years for one country; and for most countries, it does not exceed two or three 
years. 
This discussion shows that there is no perfect way to measure the existence of an effective anti-
trust regime. Therefore, this study will take a mixed approach. It will estimate different models 
with differing proxies for the existence of an antitrust regime as main explanatory variable. The 
basic model will contain a binary variable that just indicates whether an antitrust regime exists. 
As pointed out, this binary measure may have some measurement error. But this measurement 
error will only run in one direction. It is possible that some countries are coded as having an anti-
trust institution, although the antitrust regime is ineffective. Our coefficient might thus have a 
downward bias and show a smaller effect than we would find if we could perfectly measure the 
effectiveness of an antitrust system. If we find a significant effect, this effect will thus not be due 
to measurement error. 
However, I will contrast these results with the results of a second model that will use the score of 
Nicholson’s antitrust law index as main explanatory variable in order to see whether such an in-
dex based on formal characteristics is a better measure of the effectiveness of an antitrust institu-
tion than the mere binary coding. Furthermore, it is assumed that it takes some time after the in-
troduction of an antitrust law until this institutional change has some visible effect either on the 
political order or on economic development. The antitrust institution has to be established, it has 
to perform investigations and take decisions. This is a process that will not happen over night. 
Therefore, the basic model will be run in three different versions – with the antitrust variable as 
three-, five- and ten-year lag.   12
3.   The Model and the Endogeneity Problem 
There are two points in specifying the model that have to be treated more in depth. Following 
Daron Acemoglu and colleagues (2008), I assume that there are time-invariant unobservables 
that affect the political system as well as economic development and the introduction of an anti-
trust law. An example for such an unobservable would be the culture of a country.
7 In order to 
control for these time-invariant unobservables, I will use a fixed effects model. Furthermore, if 
we analyze the relationship between the existence of antitrust law and democracy, causation 
might not only run into one direction. If countries with an antitrust regime are more democratic, 
this might be due to a democratizing effect of antitrust law. But it might also be because democ-
racies are more likely to establish an antitrust institution. If we assume that wealthy elites and 
large, influential businesses have a tendency to oppose democracy because it has redistributive 
effects, then they will also have strong incentives to oppose an institution that seeks to counter-
balance economic concentration (Gerber 2006: 1196). Figure 4 shows the development of the 
democracy score of countries from ten years before the introduction of an antitrust regime to ten 
years after the introduction and compares it to the development of the democracy scores of coun-
tries that have not introduced an antitrust law to date. At the date of the introduction of the anti-
trust law, the democracy score of the countries introducing the system is significantly higher than 
of countries that do not introduce it. The same is true for economic development. States introduc-
ing an antitrust law are significantly more developed economically than states without an anti-
trust law (figure 5).
8 
A first step to cope with the endogeneity problem is to analyze lags of the independent variables. 
The political system at point t cannot be the reason for why a country introduced an antitrust law 
at t-1. However, just introducing lags will not do the trick because such a model may have an 
omitted variable bias. Although the introduction of an antitrust law at t-1 is not dependent on the 
political system at t, it may be caused by the political system at t-1. The latter is itself an influen-
tial reason for the political system we observe at t. Therefore, we have to introduce a lag of the 
dependent variable into our equation and estimate a dynamic model. For measuring the effect of 
antitrust on democracy, it will have the following form: 
dit = αdit-3 + γcit-3 + x´it-3β + υi + uit 
where dit is the democracy score for each country i in period t. The lagged value of d on the 
right-hand side of the equation is supposed to capture the mentioned persistence of democracy. 
The variable cit-3 is the main explanatory variable, i.e., the existence of an antitrust regime. The 
vector xit-3 includes all control variables of the model. The variable υi captures the fixed effects 
                                        
7   Certainly, culture is not completely time-invariant, but may change over time. However, the change of cul-
ture is extremely slow, so that it seems justified to treat it as time-invariant. Furthermore, there are some em-
pirical studies that try to proxy culture by using religion as a control variable (see, e.g. Przeworski et al. 
2000; Boix 2003). However, these studies all rely on the data of La Porta et al. (1999), which is a static 
measure measuring the religious composition at only one point in time. Thus, they treat culture as if it were 
time-invariant. 
8   See also Palim 1998.   13
of each country, and uit is the error term. The independent variables are lagged three times in 
order to model the long-term effect of the introduction of antitrust law on the political system. 
The model measuring the effect of antitrust law on economic development looks correspondingly: 
econit = αeconit-3 + γcit-3 + x´it-3β + υi + uit 
where econit is a measure of the GDP per capita of country i in period t. In order to have a better 
sense of the relationship between antitrust policy and economic development, I will not only ana-
lyze the effect on the absolute level of GDP per capita, but also on economic growth. For this 
estimation, the following model will be used: 
grit = γcit-3 + x´it-3β + υi + uit 
where grit is the average rate of economic growth per capita of the last three years. Therefore, grit 
for t = 2000 consists of the average of the growth rates from 1998-2000. Note that I have not 
included a lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation, as I do not as-
sume that there is an endogeneity problem in this case. The introduction of an antitrust system 
may depend on the absolute level of economic development, but it is unlikely to depend on the 
growth rate per capita. 
If we estimate the two dynamic models using a within-fixed-effects estimator, our estimates will 
be inconsistent. The within estimator eliminates υi from the equation by subtracting the individ-
ual country mean from each observation. Therefore, it requires that the error term uit is uncorre-
lated with all explanatory variables: 
E(uit | xi1, …, xit, …, xiT) = 0 
However, as the dynamic model contains a lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side 
of the equation, this requirement is not met because future values of the lagged dependent varia-
ble are correlated with the error term. Therefore, we have to estimate our model using the first 
difference: 
(dit-dit-1)= α(dit-3- dit-4) + γ(cit-3- cit-4)+ (x´it-3- x´it-4)β + (uit-uit-1) 
This model can also be written as: 
Δdit = αΔdit-3 + γΔcit-3 + Δx´it-3β + Δuit 
The corresponding model for estimating the effect of antitrust on the economic performance has 
the following form: 
Δeconit = αΔeconit-3 + γΔcit-3 + Δx´it-3β + Δuit 
Note that the base model contains the third lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side 
of the equation. Therefore, the variable is not automatically correlated with the error term Δuit, as 
the latter only consists of (uit-uit-1), but does not include uit-3.   14
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max.  N 
Democracy  .40 7.51 -10  10 6461 
Log GDP per capita  8.38  1.15  5.03  11.49  6398 
Antitrust .243  .439  0  1  7067 
ALI .140  .291  0  1  5917 
Growth 2.03  5.14  -34.07  70.48  6007 
Resources exports  23.98  29.14  0  100  4435 
Log  population 8.86 1.58 3.82  14.09  7440 
Int.  Environment .21  2.13 -2.41 3.86 7440 
Log trade openness  4.04  .66  .68  6.12  6415 
 
4.   The Control Variables 
While the fixed effects estimator controls for the time-invariant disturbances, there are several 
other, time-variant factors that have to be included in the model:
9 
GDP per capita: As already mentioned, there are a considerable number of scholars who claim 
that economic development has some positive effect on democratization and/or the stability of 
democracy.
10 It is also plausible that high-income countries are more likely to introduce an anti-
trust institution because they may have more money to sustain such an institution. 
Democracy: In the model which measures the effect on economic development, we will have to 
control for the level of democracy. On the one hand, it is often assumed that democracy has a 
positive effect on economic development;
11 on the other, we have seen that democratic regimes 
are more likely to introduce an antitrust regime. 
Trade openness: Trade openness should have a similar effect on economic development and de-
mocracy as the existence of an effective antitrust policy. The more open a country is for foreign 
trade, the greater the competition on the markets is within the country. Furthermore, countries 
that are open to international trade might, at the same time, be more likely to introduce an anti-
trust regime. 
Population: One can hypothesize that the size of the population of a country has an influence on 
democracy, the level of economic development and the existence of a competition regime at the 
same time. The political environment is different in large countries, compared to small ones. Fur-
thermore, countries with a large population can make use of economies of scale and are more 
interesting for foreign investment, which might give them an economic advantage. Finally, the 
market structure in large economies is different to that in small ones so that the perception of the 
necessity of an antimonopoly policy might be different (Gal 2003). 
                                        
9   For the sources of these variables, see Appendix A. 
10   See above, II 2. 
11   See Przeworski et al. 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2006, 2007.   15
International Environment: The model will also include the average democracy score of all 
countries in the same year as a proxy for the international political environment. The more de-
mocracies there are in the world, the more pressure lies on the remaining autocracies to democra-
tize. Furthermore, we have seen that the introduction of antitrust regimes is often caused by ex-
ternal pressure and thus likely to depend on the international political environment as well.
12 
Resources: There is some research on the negative effect of natural resources on economic de-
velopment and democracy – the so-called resource curse (Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001). 
Furthermore, Carles Boix (2003) claims that elites in countries which heavily rely on resources, 
and where capital is thus less mobile, oppose the introduction of institutions that have a redis-
tributive effect. Therefore, such countries should also be less likely to introduce an antitrust re-
gime. 
V.   Data Analysis and Discussion 
1.   Descriptive Statistics 
The data set comprises 154 countries during the period from 1960 to 2007. In 1960, 11 states 
already had an antitrust institution. During the observed time period, 81 countries introduced an 
antitrust system.
13 One state, Georgia, introduced an antitrust law in 1996 and effectively abol-
ished it again in 2005. Figures 4 and 5 show that states introducing an antitrust law usually have 
a higher democracy score and a higher level of economic development. However, this does not 
mean that only democracies introduce antitrust laws. There are 38 countries in the data set that 
introduced an antitrust law as non-democracies, i.e. having a democracy score of five or less. 26 
of these countries even had a democracy score of less than zero when they introduced an anti-
trust institution. Nearly half of the non-democracies that introduced an antitrust law had a transi-
tion to democracy during the observation period, which is indicated by a democracy score of six 
or more. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the effectiveness of an antitrust institution does not ful-
ly depend on the level of democracy of a country. There may be effective antitrust institutions in 
non-democracies as well as ineffective ones in democracies. I correlated the corresponding 2005 
democracy scores of the countries that have an antitrust law with two indicators on the effective-
ness of antitrust institutions of Stefan Voigt’s (Voigt 2006, 2009) data set. There is a positive 
correlation, but this correlation is weaker than one might expect. The correlation between the 
democracy score with the de jure independence of an antitrust institution is r = .144, and the cor-
relation of the democracy score with the de facto independence is r = .196. There are also indi-
vidual examples of countries with a low democracy score and a rather effective antitrust institu-
tion, as well as the other way round. Uzbekistan, for example, has a democracy score of -9, but 
its antitrust institution scores .466 on the de jure and .82 on the de facto independence scale, 
                                        
12   See above, III 1. 
13   See Appendix 2.  16
which both run from zero to one. In contrast, Argentina has a democracy score of 8, but scores 
.362 on the de jure and .45 on the de facto independence scale. 
2.   Results 
If we look at the effect of antitrust law on democracy, we find that there is almost no significant 
positive effect. Table 2 shows the results of the first difference estimator of the basic model with 
different specifications. The first three columns contain the results of a First Difference OLS re-
gression and three-year lags of the independent variables. The difference between the individual 
columns is the lag of the antitrust variable – I have included a three-, a five- and a ten-year lag. 
The coefficient of the antitrust variable is slightly positive in all models, but insignificant for the 
three- and the ten-year lag. We find a weak significance (p < .1) for the five-year lag. However, 
theoretically it does not seem to be plausible for an antitrust institution only to have a positive 
effect five years after its introduction, but that this positive effect vanishes five years later. In 
order to test the robustness of the result for the five-year lag, I also ran the model with a four- 
and a six-year lag. In both cases, the coefficient of the antitrust variable is statistically not signif-
icant.
14 The fourth column replaces the binary antitrust variable by a variable containing an eval-
uation of the effectiveness of the antitrust regime, using the antitrust law index (ALI) proposed 
by Michael Nicholson (2008) and Keith Hylton and Fei Deng (2007). The results do not change 
significantly compared to the binary measure. The coefficient is positive and has about the same 
size as the binary measures, but again it is insignificant. Therefore, it seems that antitrust law 
does not have a positive effect on democracy, contrary to our assumptions. 
                                        
14   Coefficients: antitrustt-4 = .082 (std. err.: .121); antitrustt-6 = -.085 (.309).   17
Table 2: Effects of Antitrust Law on Democracy 
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Observations 3649  3648  3306  2802 
R
2 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Notes: All specifications of the model are estimated using the first difference estimator.    
+ p < .1 | * p < .05 | ** p < .01 
 
In order to test whether this finding might be due to the composition of the data set or specifica-
tion of the model, I made some robustness checks (table 3). First, I reduced the data set to all 
observations from 1990 onwards. With this reduced data set, the five-year lag of the competition 
variable has a weakly significant positive effect on democracy. However, the ten-year lag is, 
though positive, statistically insignificant. Again, I did some robustness checks, running the 
model with a four- and a six-year lag, both of which were insignificant.
15 If we look at the con-
sequences of the introduction of an antitrust law on democracy in states that were not democratic 
when they introduced an antitrust law (i.e., they had a democracy score of 5 or less), the effect is 
statistically insignificant. 
                                        
15   Coefficients: antitrustt-4 = .115 (.193); antitrustt-6 = .278 (.237).  18



























































































































Observations 1311  840  3536  3486  3159  3486 
 
Notes: 
+ p < .1 | * p < .05 | ** p < .01 
 
Finally, I substituted the democracy score by some component variables in order to see whether 
an antitrust institution might not have a positive influence on democracy as such, but instead on 
certain institutions that form part of a stable democracy. On the one hand, I looked at the execu-
tive constraints variable that is included in the Polity IV-data set and measures the institutional-
ized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives (Marshall and Jaggers 2009: 
23). I had hypothesized that a strong concentration of economic power would lead to less execu-
tive restraints. We find that the five-year lag of the antitrust variable has a statistically significant 
positive effect on the extent of executive restraints. However, the ten-year lag is statistically in-
significant and even slightly negative. In order to test the robustness of the model with the five-
year lag, I also tested the model with a four- and a six-year lag, and found that both were statisti-
cally insignificant.
16 On the other hand, I looked at the effect of antitrust law on the level of po-
litical competition, i.e., the polcomp-variable of the Polity IV data set. With regard to this factor, 
the coefficient of the antitrust variable was statistically insignificant for all lag specifications.  
                                        
16   Coefficients: antitrustt-4 = -.020 (.012); antitrustt-6 = -.043 (.122).   19
 
Table 4: Effect of Antitrust Law on Economic Development 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 






















   
























































Antitrust * log trade 




Observations  3654  3653 3311 3654 2805 
R
2 .07  .07  .08 .07 .06 
 
Notes: All specifications of the model are estimated using the first difference estimator. 
+ p < .1 | * p < .05 | ** p < .01 
 
The situation is different for the effect of antitrust law on economic development. Table 4 shows 
that antitrust law clearly has a positive effect on economic development. Columns 1-3 again con-
tain the results of the first difference estimator of the model with the binary measure of antitrust 
law. They differ with regard to the lag of the antitrust variable. The coefficient of the antitrust 
variable is highly significant in all three cases. Furthermore, the effect becomes stronger, the 
larger the lag is. An antitrust institution that exists for three years increases the GDP per capita 
by 2 percent; an antitrust institution that exists for ten years increases the GDP per capita by 2.6 
percent. Column 5 shows the results if we substitute our binary measure by the variable measur-
ing the effectiveness of the antitrust system using the antitrust law index. Here, antitrust law also 
has a significant positive effect on economic development.  20
The model in column 4, finally, is a modification of the model with the binary antitrust measure 
as a three-year lag, which includes two interaction effects – one between antitrust law and trade 
openness and one between antitrust law and democracy. There is a significant positive interac-
tion effect between antitrust law and trade openness. Therefore, the existence of an antitrust law 
and trade openness reinforce each other. The positive effect of trade openness on economic de-
velopment is greater if a country simultaneously has an antitrust institution. At the same time, an 
antitrust institution is more effective with regard to economic development if a country is open to 
trade. Furthermore, there is a weakly significant positive interaction between antitrust and de-
mocracy. An antitrust institution is thus more effective in a democracy than in a non-democracy. 
This result should not be surprising if we consider democracy as a proxy for institutional effec-
tiveness in general. 
Finally, we analyze the effect of an antitrust institution on economic growth. If there is a positive 
effect on the level of economic development, there should also be a positive effect on economic 
growth. Table 5 shows the results of three fixed-effects OLS regressions of a three-year average 
of economic growth per capita on the binary antitrust measure. The existence of an antitrust re-
gime has a strongly significant positive effect on economic growth. Again, we see that the anti-
trust regime is the more effective the longer it is in existence. Ten years after its introduction, the 
effect of an antitrust institution on economic growth per capita is more than 50% stronger than 
three years after its introduction. 
Table 5: Effect of Antitrust Law on Growth per capita 
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Observations  3955 3954 3602 
Notes: 
+ p < .1 | * p < .05 | ** p < .01   21
3.   Discussion 
If we compare the effects of antitrust law, we find that antitrust institutions clearly have a posi-
tive effect on economic development. However, the influence on democracy seems to be weak at 
best. The only model that has a weakly significant effect is the one that includes a five-year lag. 
Does this mean that the ordoliberal thesis of the positive effect of antitrust law on democracy is 
wrong? Does economic concentration not pose dangers for democracy? These conclusions are 
not compulsive. Instead, we may think of three explanations for why the hypothesis of the nega-
tive effect of economic concentration on democracy may hold despite the results of our statistical 
analysis. 
First, the results might simply be due to a measurement error. I have pointed out the difficulties 
of measuring the effectiveness of antitrust regimes. It may well be that in some cases the antitrust 
variable has the value one, although the antitrust regime of the respective country is totally inef-
fective. Consequently, some of the ones should have been zeros instead. This kind of measure-
ment error should lead to an underestimation of the size of the coefficient. I have tried to miti-
gate this problem by also including a measure for the effectiveness of antitrust law by using the 
antitrust law index. The effect of the antitrust law index was even weaker than the one using only 
a binary measure. However, this measure is equally less than perfect as there may be a disparity 
between the formal scope of the antitrust law and its effectiveness in practice. Therefore, it can-
not be totally excluded that the coefficients would have been slightly larger (and thus possibly 
statistically significant) if I had included a better measure for the effectiveness of the antitrust 
institutions into the model. 
The other two reasons are of a more conceptual nature. It might be that the negative effects of 
economic concentration on the political system are of such a nature that they are not captured by 
the democracy score. Democratization does not necessarily lead to a vanishing of the influence 
of the economic elites on political decision-making. It only changes the form of the influence. 
Economic elites may influence politicians by the provision and selection of information, by 
campaign financing (Shapiro 2006: 108), or by certain decisions of their business policy that 
have an influence on the economic framework. If business elites have sufficient means to pro-
mote their interests even within democratic political systems, they may have fewer incentives to 
pursue a change of the system itself. 
However, the biggest reason for why we do not observe a significant effect is probably the insti-
tutional structure of current antitrust laws. The existing antitrust laws want to guarantee competi-
tive prices and thus aim at particular markets and not at the economy as a whole. As long as 
there is sufficient competition in a particular market, antitrust institutions are not concerned with 
the concentration of economic power. They try to prevent the existence of a dominant airline in 
the international civil aviation business, a dominant telephone company in the national commu-
nications business, or a dominant bakery in the local market for bread and pastries. However, 
antitrust law does not prevent business conglomerates with subsidiaries each in the civil aviation  22
business, the telecommunications business and the bakery business from emerging – as long as 
there is sufficient competition in the individual markets. 
Antitrust law is, in general, not designed to prevent economic concentration as such, but only a 
specific form of economic concentration (Amato 1997: 102-05). However, business conglomer-
ates arguably have a far greater influence on the political system than companies dominating a 
particular market (Carstensen and Questal 1978: 863; Barnes 1989: 814). There is empirical evi-
dence that conglomerate firms often control a considerable share of the national economy, which 
may range from twenty to more than fifty percent (Claessens et al. 2000; Kosenko 2007). Be-
cause of their size, they often have greater leverage and economic power. Furthermore, they may 
be able to mobilize support from a wider range of sources because they are likely to deal with a 
wider range of unions, suppliers and customers and thus have a wider network than firms con-
centrating on a particular market (Blake 1973: 591). 
VI.   Conclusion 
In the debate on the normative goals of antitrust law, there is not only disagreement about the 
appropriate goals that antitrust law is supposed to pursue, but also about the extent to which the-
se different purposes are compatible with each other.
17 The results of this study suggest that anti-
trust law, as it is currently designed, promotes economic development, but does little for democ-
ratization and the stability of democracy. The introduction of an antitrust institution has a posi-
tive effect on the level of GDP per capita and economic growth, while its effect on the 
democracy score of a country is statistically insignificant. However, this result is probably not 
due to the fact that preventing economic concentration is irrelevant for the quality of the political 
system. Rather, it may be a result of how antitrust regimes are preponderantly designed. If they 
focused more on economic concentration as such instead of dealing with particular markets, they 
might do a better job of promoting the case of democratic development in the world. 
                                        
17   See Lovdahl Gormsen 2007; Whish 2009: 19-22   23
Appendix A: Data Sources 
Variable  Description and Source  Web 
democracy  polity2-variable of the Polity IV data set 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2009) 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/ 
polity/polity4.htm 
GPD per capita 
Real GPD per capita-variable (Chain se-
ries) of the Penn World Table 6.3 Database 
(Heston et al. 2009) 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
growth 
Growth rate of real GDP chain per capita of 
the Penn World Table 6.3 Database (Hes-
ton et al. 2009) 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
antitrust 
Years for the introduction of an antitrust 
regime are taken from the Competition Law 
Database of the World Bank and the websi-
te of the Global Competition Forum (for the 




Scores for the antitrust law index are taken 
from the Antitrust World Wiki webpage. The 
ALI scores are divided by 26 (the maximum 
a country scored on the index) in order to 
make the effect comparable in size to the 




exconst-variable of the Polity IV data set 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2009) 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/ 
polity/polity4.htm 
political competition  polcomp-variable of the Polity IV data set 




Openness in current prices-variable of the 




Sum of the percentage of fuel and ores and 
metals export of all merchandise exports. 
Data is taken from the World Development 




Yearly average democracy score of all 
countries   
population  Population-variable of the Penn World Tab-
le 6.3 Database (Heston et al. 2009)  http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/  24
Appendix B: Antitrust Laws in the Data Base 
Country  Yr/DS/D  Main characteristics of the antitrust regime 
Afghanistan 
- 
No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Albania 
1995  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1995  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Argentina 
1980  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




2001  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1974  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1988  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1993  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Belarus 
1992  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1958  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
-   25
Bhutan 
- 








No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Brazil 
1994  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1998  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1994  - prohibition of cartels 
- no merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Cameroon 
1998  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1889  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 
- competition bureau as independent law enforcement agency 
9 
-1 yr 
Central African Rep. 
- 




No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Chile 
1959  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- no merger control 





No antitrust law before 2007  -7 
- 
Colombia 
1992  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 
- competition authority as part of a ministry 
9 
-35 yrs  26
Comoros 
- 








No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Costa Rica 
1994  - prohibition of cartels 
- procedure on merger control 




1995  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1989  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1992  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1972  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 













No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Egypt 
2005  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- only notification obligation in merger cases 













No antitrust law to date  - 
-   27
Estonia 
1993  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Fiji 
1998  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1988  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1953  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Georgia 
1996  Georgia basically abolished its antitrust law in 2005. The new 2005 act 
covers neither anticompetitive agreements nor the abuse of dominant 




1958  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Greece 
1977  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





















No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Honduras 
2006  - prohibition of cartels 
- procedure on merger control 




1997  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1969  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1999  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Ireland 
1973  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1988  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1958  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1991  - prohibition of the abuse of market dominance and restrictive trade 
practices 




1993  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- no merger control 




1947  - prohibition of cartels 
- procedure on merger control 




2004  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




2001  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 
- public competition authority 
-4 
-   29
Kenya 
1988  - prohibition of cartels 
- procedure on merger control 




1980  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Kyrgyzstan 
1994  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




2004  - prohibition of cartels 
- provisions on mergers 




1998  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 

















No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Lithuania 
1999  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




2000  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Malawi 
1998  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 













No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Mauritius 
2003  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- no merger control 




1992  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1992  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1993  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- no merger control 




2001  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Namibia 
2003  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Netherlands 
1956  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1986  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




2006  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
-   31
Norway 
1993  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Pakistan 
1971  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1996  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 
- independent competition authority 
9 
-7 yrs 
Papua New Guinea 
1996  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Peru 
1991  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- no merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Poland 
1990  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1986  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Romania 
1997  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1992  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Saudi Arabia 
2004  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1994  - prohibition of cartels 
- no merger control 




1999  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Singapore 
2004  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1993  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1999  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
South Africa 
1979  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1986  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1987  - prohibition of abuse of market dominance 
- merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Sweden 
1953  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1985  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 
- independent competition authority 
10 
-137 yrs   33
Syria 
- 
No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Tajikistan 
2000  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1994  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1999  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 









No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Tunisia 
1991  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1997  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 





No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
United Arab Emirates 
- 




No antitrust law to date  - 
- 
Ukraine 
2001  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1948  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1891  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




2000  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- merger notification requirement 
- independent competition authority 
10 
-15 yrs  34
Uzbekistan 
1996  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1992  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




2005  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1994  - prohibition of cartels and the abuse of market dominance 
- procedure on merger control 




1996  - prohibition of cartels 
- procedure on merger control 
- competition authority under ministerial supervision 
-6 
- 
Notes: The first row of the second column of each state indicates when the antitrust regime was introduced; the se-
cond row indicates the democracy score in that year; and the third row indicates when the country experienced a 
transition to democracy (polity2-score of more than 5). If the country was democratic when it introduced the antitrust 
law, the number is negative, i.e. the transition was in the past if the country was not democratic, the number is either 
positive, i.e. the transition followed subsequently, or is missing in case there hasn’t been a transition to date. The 
characteristics of the antitrust law refer to the state of the law in 2007, the last year of our observations. If the year of 
adopting the antitrust law and the year of entering into force or even the year when the enforcement started differ, 
this table (and the data of our analysis) refers to the entering into force and the start of the enforcement.   35
Appendix C: Graphs and Figures 
Figure 1: The Introduction of Antitrust Regimes 
  36
Figure 2: The Introduction of an Antitrust Law in South Korea   37
Figure 3: The Introduction of an Antitrust Law in Senegal  38
Figure 4: Development of Democracy Score 
 
Note: The Graph compares the development of the democracy score of countries that introduced an antitrust law 
during the observation period from 1960 to 2007 with those countries that do not have an antitrust law up to date. For 
the states introducing an antitrust law (transition), year zero is the year in which the antitrust law was introduced. For 
the states that have not yet introduced an antitrust law to date, year zero is 1994, the median year of the introduction 
of antitrust laws in the data set.   39
Figure 5: Development of GDP per capita 
 
Note: The Graph compares the development of the log GDP per capita of countries that introduced an antitrust law 
during the observation period from 1960 to 2007 with those countries that do not have an antitrust law up to date. For 
the states introducing an antitrust law (transition), year zero is the year in which the antitrust law was introduced. For 
the states that have not yet introduced an antitrust law to date, year zero is 1994, the median year of the introduction 
of antitrust laws in the data set. 
  40
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